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The Court System on Trial in Turkey
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 15, 1999, Turkish officials arrested Abdullah Ocalan,
former leader of the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK).1 Ocalan was
expelled from Syria in October 1998.2 He traveled to Greece, Russia,
and Italy, seeking political asylum.3 Greek officials took him to Kenya,
but his presence there was seen as a great security risk.4 Kenyan
officials took Ocalan to the Nairobi airport, where he was arrested by
Turkish officials and taken back to Turkey. 5
On June 29, 1999, Ocalan was sentenced to death, for under his
orders, the PKK "carried out several armed attacks, bomb attacks... and
armed robberies" which caused the death of thousands of civilians and
officers.6 Two years later, Turkey's Constitution was amended to limit
the imposition of the death penalty to times of war, imminent threat of
war, or acts of terrorism. 7 Subsequently, Ocalan's sentence was
commuted to life imprisonment. 8 Ocalan appealed to the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), alleging, among other things, a
violation of his fair trial rights under an independent and impartial
tribunal, as guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("Convention").9
This Note examines how the ECHR's decision in Ocalan and its
analysis of the Convention properly recognized rights to a fair trial as
fundamental human rights. The ECHR, however, also leaves
1. Ocalan v. Turkey, 8-12, (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Mar. 12, 2003) at
http://www.echr.coe.int.
2. Id. 9.
3. Id. 9-10.
4. Id. 9-11.
5. Id. 12.
6. Id. 42.
7. Id. 47.
8. Id.
9. See id. 3. See also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
unanswered several issues under fair trial rights. Part II presents the
facts of Ocalan's case. Part III discusses the existing law controlling the
analysis in Ocalan. Part IV examines the basis of the ECHR's holding
in Ocalan. Part V critiques the lack of clarity in how similar future
cases will be decided. Finally, Part VI considers the impact of Ocalan
on future public policy in the international community.
II. FACTS OF THE OCALAN TRIAL
Upon his arrest, Ocalan was taken to Imrali Prison in Turkey.' 0 For
nearly seven days, a prosecutor and a State Security Court judge
questioned Ocalan without allowing him any legal assistance." The first
meeting between Ocalan and his lawyers took place while a judge and
members of the security force were present; it was recorded and then
given to the State Security Court. 12 Conversations between Ocalan and
his lawyers were monitored and filmed. 13 The number and length of
visits by his lawyers were also restricted: after the first two visits, which
were two weeks apart, contact was restricted to two hourly visits a
week.'
4
Even access to the case file was restricted.' 5 Court hearings began
just two weeks after Ocalan's lawyers spent eight days photocopying
the 17,000 page file.' 6 Ocalan himself was not permitted access to his
case file until a much later hearing. 17
Meanwhile, the State Security Court was composed of two civilian
judges and one military judge.' 8 On June 18, 1999, Turkey's
Constitution was amended to exclude military members from state
security courts.' 9 The military judge was then replaced with a third
civilian judge, who had already read the file and transcripts and had
followed all proceedings. 20 This replacement arrived just a week before
the conviction and two months after court hearings began.2'
10. Ocalan, 14, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
11. Id. 141.
12. Id. 23.
13. Id. 25.
14. Id. 152.
15. Id. 25.
16. Id. 165.
17. Id. 158.
18. Id. 34.
19. See id. 39.
20. See Id. 40.
21. Seeld. 112.
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Under the circumstances of Ocalan's pre-trial proceedings and the
court's biased composition, the ECHR unanimously found that Turkey
had violated his right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial
tribunal.22
III. LEGAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Council of Europe entered the Convention in consideration of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and in pursuit of
maintaining and furthering human rights.2 3 The UDHR reaffirms the
faith of the United Nations in fundamental human rights and proclaims
a "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations" to
respect the rights and freedoms enumerated in the declaration.24
Article 6 of the Convention embodies fair trial rights. Under
Article 6(1), "everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law."26 Article 6(3) provides, among other things, that "[e]veryone
charged with a criminal offence" has the right "to have adequate time
and facilities for the preparation of his defence... [and] to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing. 27
A. Right to Independent and Impartial Tribunal
The ECHR established a standard in Incal v. Turkey for
determining whether a court is independent and impartial within the
meaning of Article 6(1).28 Factors of independence include manner of
appointment, term of office, any existing protections against outside
pressures, and appearance of independence. 29 There are two tests for
impartiality: (1) subjective impartiality, which analyzes the "personal
conviction of a particular judge in a given case" and (2) objective
impartiality, which "ascertain[s] whether the judge offered guarantees
sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect."
30
22. See id. 5-6.
23. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 9, 213 U.N.T.S. at 222-224.
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/80 (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
25. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 9, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Incal v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1550.
29. Id. at 1571.
30. Id.
2004]
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In Incal, a court composed of two civilian judges and a military
judge convicted Ibrahim Incal for distributing separatist propaganda.
31
The ECHR noted that Turkish law provided for judges to exercise their
powers completely independent of any other governmental body;32 yet,
because "military judges are accountable to their commanding officers,"
the status of military judges makes the courts' purported independence
questionable.33 The ECHR reasoned that the decisive factor in
determining whether there is a legitimate fear that a court lacks
independence or impartiality is whether the doubts of the accused are
objectively justified.34  The ECHR concluded that Incal could
legitimately fear a lack of impartiality.35 With one military judge on the
tribunal, the Court "might allow itself to be unduly influenced by
considerations which had nothing to do with the case," and thus, the
ECHR found a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention.
36
The ECHR reaffirmed Incal in Ciraklar v. Turkey.37 Cengiz
Ciraklar was arrested for holding an unauthorized demonstration with
others.38 The Izmir National Security Court, composed of two civilian
judges and one military judge, convicted Ciraklar of participating in that
demonstration and using violence against the police.39 The Ciraklar
majority followed Incal in making its ruling, holding that because one
member of the court was a military judge, the fear that the court lacked
independence and impartiality could be objectively justified;
accordingly, Turkey violated Article 6(1).40
B. Rights to Fair Trial Proceedings
Several ECHR cases deal with the extent of fair trial protections
under Article 6(3). In Kremzow v. Austria, the ECHR considered what
constitutes "adequate time and facilities" for preparing a defense under
Article 6(3)(b).4' Here, three weeks was sufficient time to prepare a
31. Id. at 1552-54.
32. See id. at 1587.
33. Id. at 1587-88.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1586.
36. Id. at 1587.
37. Ciraklar v. Turkey, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3060, 3071-74.
38. Id. at 3064.
39. Id. at 3064-65.
40. Id. at 3073-74.
41. Kremzow v. Austria, 268 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 28,41 (1994).
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reply to a forty-nine page document and did not unfairly disadvantage
the accused.42
In Magee v. United Kingdom, Gerard Magee was denied legal
assistance for over forty-eight hours, during which time he made
incriminating statements.43 The ECHR noted that the right to legal
counsel at the initial stages of police interrogation is not explicitly stated
in the Convention, and "may be subject to restriction for good cause.
44
Thus, the central issue was whether the restriction deprived the accused
of a fair hearing, in light of all proceedings.45 The ECHR held that
denying legal counsel for over forty-eight hours and holding the
accused incommunicado during intensive questioning was not justified,
and violates Article 6 rights.
46
Article 6(3) has also been construed to protect confidential
attorney-client communications. For example, in Brennan v. United
Kingdom,47 Thomas John Brennan alleged that the United Kingdom
violated his rights under Article 6(3)(c) because of an alleged breach of
attorney-client confidentiality.48 Brennan contended that a police officer
was present within sight and hearing of his consultations with his
lawyer, thereby destroying his attorney-client confidentiality.49 The
ECHR held that while an accused's right to speak privately with his
attorney out of hearing of a third person is a basic requirement of a fair
trial, that right may be restricted for good cause, as stated in Magee.
5
0
Where there is no compelling reason for a restriction, even if done in
good faith, the ECHR will find a violation of Article 6(3)(c). 5'
Similarly, in Lanz v. Austria, the ECHR found that surveillance of
attorney-client contacts by the investigating judge violated the right to a
fair trial under Article 6(3)(c).52 To justify such surveillance the
government must give "very weighty reasons.
' 53
42. Id. at 41-42.
43. Magee v. United Kingdom, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 159, 172, 175-76.
44. Id. at 174.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 175-76.
47. 213 Eur. Ct. H.R. 232, 232 (2001).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 233.
51. Id. at 234, 235.
52. Lanz v. Austria, (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Jan. 31, 2002) at http://www.echr.coe.int.
53. Id. 52.
2004]
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IV. THE ECHR's RATIONALE IN OCALAN
In Ocalan v. Turkey, the ECHR held that Turkey violated Ocalan's
right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. Ocalan was not
tried by an independent and impartial tribunal because of the
composition of the court. 4 Ocalan's fair trial rights were also violated
because he had restricted access to legal assistance, he was unable to
communicate confidentially with his lawyers, and he had limited access
to the case file.55
A. Trial Before a Military Judge
The ECHR relied upon the standard in Incal to determine whether
the state court in Ocalan was independent and impartial. 6 Under the
Incal standard, 57 the State Security Court's independent and impartial
depend upon whether defendant Ocalan had any legitimate reason to
fear that the military judge's presence would cause the court to "be
unduly influenced by considerations" irrelevant to the case." Although
the military judges had been replaced according to a constitutional
amendment, and the State Security Court consisted of three civilian
judges when Ocalan was actually convicted,59 the ECHR held that this
"last-minute replacement of the military judge," could not remedy the
defect in the Court's composition. Most of the trial had already taken
place with the military judge on the bench.6 ° Moreover, the ECHR
reasoned that with the high-profile nature of the case due to Ocalan's
reputation, 6' a military judge's presence could have only "raise[d]
doubts in the accused's mind as to the independence and impartiality of
the court. ' 62 As a result, the ECHR concluded that the State Security
Court was neither independent nor impartial, in violation of Article
6(1).63
54. Ocalan, 169, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
55. Id. 169.
56. Id. 114-15.
57. See Incal, 1988-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1571.
58. Ocalan, 114, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
59. Id. 117.
60. Id. 118.
61. Ocalan has been known as the founder and leader of the Worker's Party of Kurdistan
(PKK), whose activities included organized armed attacks on major landowners and paramilitary
preparations. Since 1984, the PKK has "carried on an armed struggle within Turkey." Ocalan told
the ECHR that as the PKK's leader, decisions taken by the PKK were submitted to him for final
approval. Id. 20.
62. Id. 120.
63. Id. 121.
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B. Unfair Trial Proceedings
Next, the ECHR considered whether Ocalan was given a fair trial
under Article 6(3). Article 6 normally requires the accused to receive
legal assistance at the beginning of police interrogation. 64 Defendant
Ocalan, however, was denied legal assistance for almost seven days,
during which time he made self-incriminating statements.65 Denial of
legal access "for such a long period" was detrimental to the defendant's
rights.66
As for attorney-client communication, the ECHR noted that
Ocalan's first visit from his attorneys were supervised and "within sight
and hearing of members of the security forces and a judge. 67 In
subsequent meetings, prison officers were always present in an
adjoining room with the door open, thus all meetings between Ocalan
and his lawyers were within sight and hearing of third parties.68 The
ECHR stated that the right to communicate confidentially with legal
counsel is "part of the basic requirements of a fair trial in a democratic
society and follows from Article 6(3)(c). 6 9  Confidential
communication is necessary because surveillance causes legal
assistance to "lose much of its usefulness., 70 Thus, Ocalan's inability to
confer confidentially with his lawyers violated his rights under Article6(3 )(C).71
Another issue was whether the number and length of the meetings
between Ocalan and his attorneys violated Article 6.72 Although Article
6(3)(c) provides a defendant with the right to defend himself in person
or through legal assistance, the manner of exercising this right is
unspecified.73 As a result, it is left up to the states to ensure this right,
and up to the courts to determine whether the method used is consistent
with a fair trial.74 Although the ECHR recognized the government's
security concerns in restricting the length of visits, 75 the limit of two
64. Id. 140.
65. Id. T 141.
66. Id. T 143.
67. Id. T 144.
68. Id. T 145.
69. Id. 146.
70. Id.
71. Id. T 151.
72. Id. TT 152-57.
73. Id. T 153.
74. Id.
75. The ECHR noted that the charges against Ocalan included "numerous acts of violence
perpetrated by an illegal armed organization." Also, Ocalan was charged as being the leader of
2004]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
hourly visits a week is not easily justified, especially in light of the
complexity and breadth of Ocalan's case.76 With the lack of a sufficient
justification for these restrictions, the ECHR found that the limits
complicated effective preparation of Ocalan's defense, and violated his
rights under Article 6.
The ECHR also 'looked at Ocalan and his lawyers' access to the
voluminous case file.78 Ocalan's attorneys could not provide him with a
copy of the case file documents before hearings. 79 Given Ocalan's
position in the PKK, he would have been the best person to assess the
evidence and determine those individuals responsible for the violent
acts.80 Thus, his lack of access to any documents "compound[ed] the
difficulties" in preparing his defense and violated his rights under
Articles 6(1) and 6(3).81
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The ECHR's decision in Ocalan represents an important step in
ensuring fair trials for all defendants, regardless of their political status
or notoriety. At the same time, however, the ECHR left some questions
unanswered.
A. Right to an Independent and Impartial Tribunal
The ECHR correctly recognized that the presence of a military
judge denied the defendant an independent and impartial tribunal. Yet
Ocalan is distinguishable from Incal and Ciraklar by the fact that in
Ocalan, a civilian judge replaced the military judge before the
conviction. Most of the trial, however, had already taken place before
the replacement. 82 Thus, the ECHR expanded the rule from Incal and
Ciraklar by holding that even though a military judge is replaced by a
civilian judge before the end of trial, the presence of the military judge
for most of the trial renders the tribunal neither independent nor
impartial.83 This conclusion is consistent with the provisions in Article
this organization and the "principal instigator of its acts." Given the nature of such charges, the
ECHR understandably recognized the government's security concerns. Id. 154.
76. Id. 154-55.
77. Id. 157.
78. Id. 158.
79. Id.
80. Id. 161.
81. Id. 163.
82. Id. 118.
83. Id.
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6. While Article 6 specifies that every accused holds the right to an
independent and impartial tribunal, there is no designation as to which
portion of trial proceedings the independent and impartial requirement
applies.84 The broad, open-ended language of Article 6, however,
supports a fair and impartial trial in the entirety of the proceedings.
Even though the Turkish court attempted to remedy the situation by
having a third civilian judge on the bench, 5 an independent and
impartial tribunal was necessary for the entire trial process.
It remains unclear, however, at what point in the trial proceedings,
if any, such a replacement would render a tribunal independent and
impartial. The ECHR only considered the situation at issue, where a
civilian judge replaced a military judge near the end of trial.86 Had the
civilian judge come earlier in the trial, there may have been an
independent and impartial tribunal, notwithstanding the initial presence
of a military judge on the bench. Unfortunately, the ECHR failed to
address whether any earlier replacement would have made the Turkish
state court independent or impartial.
Related to this question is the extent of the judge's involvement in
the trial. In Ocalan, the ECHR noted that before the military judge was
replaced, the prosecution had already presented its entire case and two
preliminary hearings and six main hearings had already taken place.87 In
short, the military judge had already participated in the bulk of the
decisions made during trial.88 While the third civilian judge had
followed the trial from the beginning and attended all the hearings, he
was not entitled to vote. 89 His involvement was minimal because of his
observance with lack of influence. Because the third civilian judge did
not take an active role in trial proceedings until the end, his participation
for the remainder of the trial proceedings was essentially insubstantial
because he could not make the Court independent and impartial. 90 It
remains to be seen whether an entitlement to vote or being consulted by
the three judges on the bench would have changed the outcome.
This possibility also raises the issue of whether or not a military
judge could ever be deemed impartial, despite his connection to the
84. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 9, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228.
85. Ocalan, 117, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
86. Id. 118.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. 117.
90. See id. 118.
2004]
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state military. The Ocalan court implies a negative answer, stating that
regardless of whether the military judge exerted influence over the other
two civilian judges, it was the "very presence" of the military judge that
made the tribunal neither independent nor impartial. 91 In assessing
whether members of the bench are independent, the ECHR disregards
the factors laid out in Incal.92 The ECHR does not address whether there
are any situations in which an independent tribunal may include a
military judge.
The Incal Court determined that because of the manner of
appointing military judges and their accountability to the strictures of
the military system, they are inherently partial and cannot be objectively
impartial on the bench. This blanket application to all military judges,
while seemingly accurate on its face, disregards the personal
circumstances and status of each military judge. For example, the
ECHR should take into account whether the judge seeks a renewal of
his position on the tribunal, or how the judge has ruled in the past.
These questions about the individual situation and qualities of a military
judge affect the assessment of the independence or impartiality of a
tribunal. These questions also suggest that there may be circumstances
under which the presence of a military judge does not void per se the
independent or impartial nature of a tribunal.
Another ambiguous standard is the accused's legitimate cause to
fear possible bias in a tribunal.94 From Incal to Ciraklar to Ocalan, the
assessment of what is a legitimate reason for doubting a tribunal's
independence and impartiality appears to be a case-by-case basis. There
seems to be a trend for such a legitimate reason being recognized,
however, in situations where a political or military conflict exists
between the accused and the State. In Incal, the defendant was tried for
distributing separatist propaganda. 95 In Ciraklar, the defendant was tried
for holding an unauthorized demonstration, distributing separatist
propaganda, and violently resisting the police.96 In Ocalan, the
defendant was a high profile defendant who had been involved in
lengthy conflicts with Turkish military authorities.97 In all of these
situations, the accused was engaged in political or military conflicts
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Incal, 1988-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1571.
94. Ocalan, 114, at http://www.echr.coe.int; Incal, 1988-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1586-87.
95. Incal, 1988-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1572-74.
96. Ciraklar, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3064.
97. Ocalan, 120, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
526 [Vol. 26:517
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with the government. 98 Under these circumstances, the ECHR
consistently found that a military judge's presence caused legitimate
doubt that the tribunal was independent or impartial.
B. Abridging the Right to a Fair Trial
Given the broad language of Article 6, the ECHR properly gave
extensive protection to Ocalan's fair trial rights. The ECHR recognized,
however, that the rights afforded to defendants are not absolute. 99 The
ECHR has previously stated that rights "may be subject to restriction for
good cause."' 00 The issue in each case turns on whether the restriction
"has deprived the accused of a fair hearing." 10 1 Up to now, this
determination has been made on a case-by-case basis; the ECHR has not
specifically laid out what constitutes justified, legitimate restrictions on
Article 6 rights. It may be desirable to leave this as a case-by-case
analysis, for the Court would simply look at the restriction in each
circumstance and determine whether it is justified. Yet, under this
rubric, the ECHR would have to compare the restriction at issue with all
the restrictions analyzed in past cases. This approach could easily lead
to confusion and inconsistent holdings. Laying out a standard for
analyzing what constitutes good cause restrictions would be more
helpful to lawyers and judges, providing better guidelines for future
cases.
In previous case law and in Ocalan, the ECHR only stated what
kinds of justifications would not be legitimate restrictions. In Magee,
the government delayed the defendant's access to a solicitor, during
which time the "intimidating atmosphere [was] specifically devised to
sap [the defendant's] will and make him confide in his interrogators."'
10 2
This delay in allowing access to legal assistance "irretrievably
prejudiced" the defendant because during the forty-eight hours where he
was denied legal assistance, he made incriminating statements that
formed the basis for his eventual conviction.
0 3
Further, in Brennan, the government argued that the presence of a
police inspector during the defendant's consultation with his solicitor
98. Id.
99. Id. 1 140.
100. See Magee, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 170. See also Brennan, 213 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 233;
Lanz, 52, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
101. Ocalan, 140, athttp://www.echr.coe.int.
102. Magee, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 161, 165.
103. Id. at 161, 175-76.
20041
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was justified. 0 4 There was purportedly a good reason for police
presence because of a "risk of prejudice to the ongoing search for two
other suspected persons."' 10 5 Moreover, "legal assistance could still be
effectively given" with third parties present because the police here
were unconnected with the case. 106 The ECHR disagreed, stating that
while there was "no reason to doubt the good faith of the police" in
mandating their presence, there was still "no compelling reason" for
imposing such a restriction. 10 7 Although the officer was present at only
one meeting, making this a "restriction.. .of very limited duration," the
ECHR still found that such presence would prevent the accused from
candidly speaking with his solicitor."' 0 8 From Brennan, there is an
underlying rule that the presence of any police during consultations
between the accused and his attorney cannot have any legitimate
justification.
Meetings between the accused and his attorneys were also under
surveillance in Lanz.10 9 The government in Lanz argued that
surveillance was necessary to "ensure successful investigations"
because without the judge's presence in the beginning of the
investigation, there was a risk that the contacts between the accused and
his counsel would "lead to an interference with evidence.""l 0 The
ECHR found that the government's reasoning was not sufficient to
justify surveillance."' In short, surveillance of attorney-client
communications cannot be substantiated by reason of preventing
interference with evidence.
Meanwhile, in Ocalan, the defendant was given restricted access
to his counsel. 12 The ECHR concedes that holding Ocalan on the Island
of Imrali was understandable, but "restricting visits [from his lawyers]
to two hourly visits a week is less easily justified." ' 13 The ECHR further
notes that the government did not provide any explanations to justify
these restrictions.' 14 The ECHR does not indicate the extent of
restrictions that would be legitimate, however, or what type of
104. Brennan, 213 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 213, 233.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 213, 234.
108. Id. at213,234-235.
109. Lanz, 49, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
110. Id. 49.
111. Id. 52.
112. Ocalan, 145-48, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
113. Id. 155.
114. Seeid. 155.
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explanations would justify the restrictions in circumstances such as
Ocalan's. One of the only indications of a restriction that was justified
was the amount of time allotted for looking at the case file.' 15 In
Kremzow, the ECHR determined that three weeks was sufficient for the
defendant and his counsel to reply to a forty-nine page document.
11 6
Here, Ocalan's counsel had only two weeks to review a 17,000 page
case file; "coupled with other difficulties encountered by the defence,"
two weeks was insufficient time. 17 In none of these cases, however,
does the ECHR ever expressly state what is legitimate. Instead, the
ECHR remains very fact-specific, providing minimal guidance about
what restrictions or reasons would still ensure a fair trial for the
accused.
Another term conveniently left undefined is "practical and
effective rights," for the ECHR does not exactly explain what rights are
encompassed here." 8 The ECHR simply notes that the Convention was
designed to guarantee "rights that are practical and effective."" 9 While
the ECHR never explicitly defines practical and effective rights, it
points to a broad standard of "the entirety of the domestic proceedings"
in determining whether a fair trial has been achieved in accordance with
Article 6.120 This standard is flawed in the same manner as the standard
for determining legitimate restrictions on rights. The focus on a fact-
specific inquiry leaves too much room for ambiguity and a great
potential for future inconsistent holdings.
The ECHR also considered "adequate time and facilities" under
Article 6(3)(b). 12 1 Article 6(3)(b) addresses whether the defendant had
enough time and access to facilities or materials necessary to prepare a
defense.122 The ECHR in Ocalan interpreted this provision to mean
whether restrictions placed on the defense were so substantial and
without legitimate justification as to render preparation unjustly
difficult, in turn making it inadequate time and facilities. 123 In Ocalan,
the defendant's access to his case file and the extent of communications
115. See id. 160-161.
116. Kremzow, 268 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 42.
117. Ocalan, T 167-68, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
118. Seeid. 153.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. 123.
122. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 9, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228.
123. See Ocalan, 123, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
2004]
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with his lawyers are encompassed under this provision.1 24 The Ocalan
Court found a violation of Article 6(3)(b) in the restrictions placed upon
the number and length of visits between defendant and his lawyers.
125
Imposing such restrictions was "one of the factors which made the
preparation of [Ocalan's] defence difficult and contrary" to Article 6.126
The ECHR also concluded that Article 6(3)(b) was breached because of
the limited access to the case file. 127 Ocalan and his attorneys' inability
to gain full, direct access to the case file early on in trial proceedings
increased the difficulties encountered in preparing the defense.'
28
The substanial difficulties Ocalan and his attorneys encountered
violated Ocalan's fair trial rights. 29 Where circumstances compound
difficulties in the ability to prepare one's defense, especially where the
obstacles result from government-imposed restrictions, the ECHR will
consider that the guarantee of "adequate time and facilities" to prepare
for trial has been breached.13
0
VI. FUTURE PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Impact of Ocalan on the International Community
The ECHR's ruling will have definite ramifications throughout the
international community. It reinforces human rights principles by
recognizing the significance of fair trial rights as part of every
individual's fundamental human rights. Affording a defendant access to
legal counsel and an independent and impartial tribunal contributes to
ensuring a fair trial and giving legitimacy to a state's judicial
proceedings.
The Ocalan ruling and the fair trial standards set forth are directly
applicable to the current controversy at Guantanamo Bay, especially
regarding the United States' policy decision regarding the detainees
held there. The large-scale arrests of "unlawful combatants" and their
confinement at Guantanamo have brought the United States under close
international scrutiny, focusing on how the United States is flouting its
legal obligations to afford detainees their rights under the Geneva
124. Id, 152-69.
125. Id. T 157.
126. Id.
127. Id. 163,168.
128. Id.
129. Id. T 169.
130. See id.
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Conventions, 131 including those rights upheld in Ocalan. The United
States has "imprisoned hundreds of terrorist suspects.. .for well over a
year. 132 None have been brought before a judge. 133 None have been
given access to a defense lawyer. 34 None have been charged, and none
have been tried."'135 While being denied legal counsel, detainees are
reportedly being subjected to extensive interrogations.' 36 Moreover,
possible trials would be held before military tribunals, which have
lowered standards of evidence.'
37
Where Turkey was bound to uphold its legal obligations under the
Convention, the United States should likewise be bound to its
obligations under the Geneva Conventions.' 38 Unlike Turkey, however,
who was ultimately forced to recognize Ocalan's fair trial rights, the
United States continues to breach its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions through semantics, labeling the detainees "unlawful
combatants" rather than "prisoners of war."' 3 9 The main controversy at
issue is whether, under an "unlawful combatants" label, the United
States must adhere to the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. 4 The
Third Geneva Convention guarantees prisoners of war (POW) certain
rights, while the Fourth Geneva Convention protects persons "taken into
enemy custody during an armed conflict."' 141 As "unlawful combatants,"
Guantanamo detainees stand in limbo between these two Geneva
Conventions, receiving the rights of neither POWs nor civilians. 142 In
spite of this uncertain status, unlawful combatants do not lack all
rights. 143 Under Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, persons are
131. See Erin Chlopak, Dealing with the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Humanitarian and
Human Rights Obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, 9 HUM. RTS. BR. 6, 6 (2002).
132. Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., A Tale of Two Countries, CHIC. DAILY L. BULL., May 1, 2003,
at 6.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE THREAT OF A BAD EXAMPLE: UNDERMINING INT'L
STANDARDS AS "WAR ON TERROR" DETENTIONS CONTINUE 17 (Aug. 2003), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library.
137. Id.
138. See generally Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
done on August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Fourth Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done on August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
139. See Chlopak, supra note 131, at 6.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 7.
143. Id.
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given broad protections, where such persons come into the hands of a
Party to a conflict of which they are not nationals. 144
The policy of broadly interpreting rights in order to extend them to
all persons captured during an armed conflict is consistent with the
broad interpretation of fair trial rights recognized in Ocalan. Even under
the "unlawful combatants" label, the United States is obligated to place
detainees in front of a competent tribunal to determine each individual's
status before conveniently applying a blanket label to all detainees and
denying them their rights. Moreover, the United States cannot hide
behind the label "war on terrorism" to deny rights to the detainees. This
is clear from Ocalan. Putting Ocalan, a Kurd leader, on trial can be seen
as fighting terrorism in Turkey and the Middle East, and the ECHR's
"judgment constitutes an important step to set the legal frame for
measures.. .taken in the 'war on terrorism."",145 The U.S. claim of a war
on terrorism thus holds no sway in denying rights to the detainees. The
United States must follow the legal rules to which it has obligated itself,
and act consistently with the Ocalan ruling by affording all detainees
the rights provided under the Geneva Conventions.
B. The Political Impact of Ocalan
Ocalan's case also hits a sore point between Turkey and the
European Union. Human rights abuses in Turkey has been a
predominate obstacle in Turkey's candidacy for membership in the
European Union.146 Turkey has lobbied to join the EU for years, but "its
human rights record has been a persistent sticking point."'147 Under
pressure from the EU to improve its human rights record and in its
efforts to become an EU member, Turkey abolished the death penalty to
bring its laws into conformity with EU requirements. 148 This
amendment occurred after Ocalan's initial death sentence; after the law
changed, his punishment was commuted to life imprisonment in
October 2002. 149 Although Turkey made this important change in its
laws, the ECHR's ruling in Ocalan highlights questionable human
rights practices in Turkey that have contributed to curbing the
144. Id. at 6, 7.
145. Florian Hauswiesner, What is the Legal Fight Against Terrorism?: The Case of Ocalan
v. Turkey Decided by the European Court for Human Rights, 19 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. RPTR
222, 224 (2003).
146. Frank Bruni, Court Faults Turkish Trial of a Kurd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2003, at A8.
147. Id.
148. Bruni, supra note 146, at A8.
149. Ocalan, 47, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
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realization of Turkey's EU membership. If Turkey took the ECHR's
decision as an opportunity to correct its human rights record, it may
help to show the state's commitment to bringing itself in line with
human rights norms, and shed a brighter light on its candidacy to the
EU.
Instead, Turkey has appealed the decision to the Grand Chamber
of the ECHR, which has the quality of an appeals court.' 50 On June 12,
2003, Turkey officially rejected the ECHR's decision in Ocalan that
Ocalan was not judged fairly.' 51 The Foreign Ministry stated that
Turkey would appeal because the "grounds for decision and the results
related to this are far from sound."'
152
Turkey's appeal of the Ocalan decision will do little to help its bid
for EU membership. If the Grand Chamber of the ECHR finds again for
Ocalan and rules that Turkey's trial was unfair, Turkey will have to
reexamine its human rights practices and change its ways before it can
hope to win a seat in the EU. As one commentator noted, "[i]f the court
upholds its earlier decision and Turkey refuses to accept it, the Ocalan
case will be marked down by EU officials as another 'human rights
violation' against Turkey when its application for EU membership is
reviewed."' 153 Certainly, Turkey's refusal to recognize the ECHR's
decision in Ocalan and change its practices accordingly will undercut
its chances of gaining EU membership.
C. Conclusion
The ECHR's decision in Ocalan signifies an important step in
upholding the legitimacy of justice systems and guaranteed rights under
international human rights treaties. The ECHR, however, leaves some
issue unresolved. The ECHR does not determine at what point in trial
proceedings, if any, could replacing a military judge with a civilian
judge render a tribunal independent and impartial. Also, the ECHR
never reaches the issue of whether a military judge could ever be
deemed independent and impartial. While the ECHR uses several
standards to determine whether Ocalan's rights were violated, these
standards are ambiguous. They are never fully defined, but appear to be
150. Turkey Appeals Against European Court Ruling on Rebel Kurd's Trial, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jun. 12, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, BBMIR File.
151. Id.
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applied on a case-by-case basis, such as a "legitimate cause to fear" that
the tribunal is biased, good cause restrictions against an accused's fair
trial rights, and "practical and effective rights."
Despite some of the Court's inconclusive holdings, Ocalan
reaffirms the inviolability of human rights and. reaffirms State
obligations under international treaties. For the United States, Ocalan
strengthens the opposition against U.S. actions in Guantanamo, for the
United States denies what Ocalan upholds-fair trial rights and
obligations under human rights treaties. By denying these rights, the
United States is "systematically evading application of domestic and
international law." '154 Consequently, the United States would "fail to
inspire confidence in democratic societies" or anywhere for that
matter.155 To regain this confidence and uphold human rights, it is
imperative that the United States bow to its obligations under the
Geneva Conventions. Otherwise, the so-called democracy of America is
no better than an authoritarian state such as Turkey.
For Turkey's political ambitions, Ocalan affect its chances of
joining the EU. By accepting the ECHR's decision and reforming State
practices, Turkey may have a greater opportunity for gaining the much
coveted EU membership. By challenging the ECHR's decision, Turkey
may find itself making membership even more difficult and out of
reach. The foremost priority of Turkey, and every other state, is to
ensure the fundamental human rights of every individual. When
Turkey's court system was put on trial, the ECHR found that human
rights, particularly fair trial rights, were of utmost importance and
obligatory upon every party to the Convention.
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